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The Supreme Court appears to be taking every
opportunity to set “bright line” rules, which have the ef-
fect of significantly limiting the application of the death
penalty in the united States.  In Roper v. Simmons2, the
Court held that no one who was under the age of eight-
een when he or she committed a crime could be exe-
cuted.  The Court clearly announced in Atkins v.
Virginia3 that the death penalty does not apply to the
mentally retarded.  Most recently the Court handed
down its decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana4 which in ef-
fect holds that a state may not impose a penalty of death
on an individual for crime that did not result in the death
of the victim.5
In deciding Kennedy v. Louisiana, is the Court
simply stating that Coker v. Georgia6 controls in all
death penalty cases and, as such, applying that decision
in an ever broadening manner?  Or was the Court re-
sponding to the “prevailing decency standard” noted in
Trop v. Dulles?7 Perhaps the Supreme Court is trying to
avoid deciding which non-homicide crimes are worthy
of death.  According to the recent decisions handed
down, the Court created bright line rules restricting the
application of the death penalty in the united States.  
Our task is not to give effect to our indi-
vidual views on capital punishment;
rather, we must determine what the Con-
stitution permits a state to do under its
reserved powers…. The Court has over-
stepped the bounds of proper constitu-
tional adjudication by substituting its
policy judgment for that of the state leg-
islature.– Chief Justice Warren Burger.8
Since before this country’s inception, societies
have used death as a form of punishment.9 The first doc-
umented execution in the united States occurred in
1608.10 When the Founding Fathers wrote the u.S. Con-
stitution, the colonies utilized the death penalty as a 
form of punishment.  The lack of explicit prohibition on
the use of the death penalty indicates the Framers ac-
cepted the death penalty as an appropriate means of pun-
ishment.11 It appears the Framers of the Constitution
never intended for the States to extinguish the applica-
tion of the death penalty through the “cruel and unusual
punishment” provision.  The Fifth Amendment ensures
that, no person can be deprived of “life, liberty, or prop-
erty” without due process of law.12 Therefore, the clear
implication is not that the government is forbidden from
taking a life, but rather that before the government may
take a life, that indi-












penalty as they deemed appropriate in accordance with
the penal systems they developed.14 Generally, the
States reserved the death penalty for the crimes of mur-
der and rape; however some permitted capital punish-
ment for crimes against religion and the government.15
Massachusetts was the first state to restrict the use of
the death penalty, stating capital crimes were limited to
“murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson, rape, and
treason.”16 In response to these restrictions, other states
followed suit, including those that divided the crime of
murder into degrees.17
In 1846, Michigan bowed to the demands of
abolitionists and abolished the death penalty for all
crimes with the exception of treason.18 During the next
half century, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Iowa, Maine and
Colorado abolished the death penalty for all crimes.19
The trend toward abolishing the death penalty gained
momentum after the turn of the century, when nine
states did away with their death penalty laws.20 how-
ever, around the beginning of World War I, six of the
nine states reinstated their death penalty statutes.21
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Introduction
The lack of explicit pro-
hibition on the use of the
death penalty indicates
the Framers accepted
the death penalty as an
appropriate means of
punishment.11
History of the Death Penalty in American
The most dramatic developments in the united
States death penalty doctrine occurred prior to 1970,
taking place in various state legislatures.  In 1972, in the
Furman v. Georgia decision, the Supreme Court effec-
tively removed the power of the States to legislate the
application of the death penalty.22 Since Furman, the
Court has taken the lead role in restricting and narrow-
ing the application of the death penalty in this country,
a role specifically granted to the legislatures of the in-
dividual states.23
The Court subsequently defined the eighth
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” provision and noted
the purpose behind the death penalty:  
The eighth Amendment bars not only
those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but
also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation
to the crime committed, and a punish-
ment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional
if it (1) makes no measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment
and hence is nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain
and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of pro-
portion to the severity of the crime.24
We have held there are two distinct so-
cial purposes served by the death
penalty: “retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offend-
ers.”25
Since the ruling in Furman, many states passed
new legislation reinstating the death penalty; however,
these new laws placed restrictions on the application of
the death penalty and created guidelines to narrow the
specific class of crimes punishable by death.  Yet, the
Supreme Court continues to restrict death penalty appli-
cation.26
Which States Have Enacted Death Penalty Legisla-
tion and Which Methods of Execution are Utilized
Currently, thirty-six states have death penalty
statutes.27 In total, there are five different methods of
execution allowed:  lethal injection,28 electrocution,29
lethal gas,30 firing squad,31 and hanging.32 Although the
vast majority of states primarily use lethal injection,
twenty states have alternate methods available, gener-
ally contingent on the choice of the inmate.33
State statutes permitting lethal injection typically
provide:  “The punishment of death must be inflicted by
continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quan-
tity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination
with a chemical paralytic agent until death is pro-
nounced by a licensed physician according to accepted
standards of medical practice.”  The typical protocol uti-
lizes a three-drug combination consisting of sodium
pentothal,34 pancuronium bromide,35 and potassium
chloride.36 each drug is given in a lethal amount, re-
spectively causing the prisoner to become unconscious,
inducing the cessation of breathing, and producing car-
diac arrest.37
States that permit execution by electrocution
generally provide: “The sentence shall be executed by
causing to pass through the body of the convict a current
of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death, and
the application and continuance of such current through
the body of such convict shall continue until such con-
vict is dead.”38 Some of the most common problems
with execution include: burning of parts of the body, the
necessity for repeated shocks, and the inmate’s aware-
ness of the procedure.39
In the four states that still permit the use of lethal
gas as an option for execution, the statutes generally
read:  “The punishment of death must be inflicted by the
administration of a lethal gas.”40 Although on the sur-
face this method of execution appears outdated and an-
tiquated, the only negative effect noted is the relatively
lengthy time it takes for death to occur.41
While three states authorize hanging as a method
of execution, hangings are infrequent as the last hanging
execution occurred in 1996 in Delaware.42 Although
hanging is the oldest method of execution in this coun-
try, it fell out of favor during the last century due to
many botched attempts and was eventually replaced by
electrocution.43
Of the three states authorizing execution by fir-
ing squad, utah was the last to perform such an execu-
tion.44 The utah statute provided for a five-person firing
squad; of these five shooters, one would unknowingly
carry a blank cartridge in his weapon, allowing each
member of the firing squad to believe he did not end the
prisoner’s life.45
Which Crimes are Worthy of Death:
Federal and State
In a line of cases following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Furman v. Georgia,46 the Court narrowed the
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application of the death penalty among the states still
enacting death penalty statutes.  The Court has held that
the eighth Amendment bars execution of certain classes
of offenders.  In deciding whether a specific death
penalty statute is violative of the eighth Amendment’s
“cruel and unusual punishment” prohibition, the Court
will consider whether there is a “reliable indicia” of a
“national consensus” against the execution of certain
classes of offenders.47 When evaluating the “national
consensus” the Court applies a two-part test that con-
siders state legislation and the actions of sentencing ju-
ries.48 Yet it has become clear that the Court is now
more willing than ever to disregard this standard in lieu
of its “own judgment.”49
Looking facially at the legislation of the various
states and the federal government, the Court narrowed
the application of the death penalty well beyond the “na-
tional consensus.”   For instance, the federal government
passed legislation declaring the following crimes to be
death eligible: genocide,50 hostage taking resulting in
death,51 kidnapping resulting in death,52 murder,53 ter-
rorism,54 torture resulting in death,55 treason,56 use of in-
terstate commerce facilities in the commission of
murder-for-hire,57 war crimes,58 and the assassination, or
kidnapping resulting in the death of a Congress, cabinet,
or Supreme Court member.59 evaluating the laws of the
various states with death penalty enactments, the con-
sensus among the states is equally as clear.  Of the thirty-
six states that permit capital punishment, all allow the
death penalty in cases of first-degree murder.  Some
states also allow the imposition of death in cases of trea-
son,60 train wrecking,61 capital drug trafficking,62 capital
sexual battery,63 aircraft hijacking,64 perjury resulting in
death,65 kidnapping with aggravating factors,66 placing
a bomb near a bus terminal,67 espionage,68 and child
rape.69
Between the various states and the federal gov-
ernment, over twenty separate categories of criminal ac-
tivity, besides murder, can trigger the seating of a death
eligible jury in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
This is the will of the people.  These are the legislative
enactments.  These are the sentences the juries have
handed down.  Therefore, these statutes form the “na-
tional consensus” and trump the “personal judgment” of
nine Justices sitting in Washington, D.C.
Who is on America’s Death Row
In the thirty-six states with the death penalty, the
government (state and federal) has carried out a total of
1,111 executions70 since the 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia.71 The decision in Gregg marked the beginning
of the Supreme Court’s concerted efforts to narrow the
application of the death penalty.  Gregg and the subse-
quent cases created bright line rules,72 which have sig-
nificantly restricted the scope of the death penalty,
thereby expanding the number of prisoners growing old
on death row.73
The united States Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics compiled information detailing the
characteristics of those prisoners on death row in the
united States.74 As of December 31, 2006, the follow-
ing statistics accurately depict the make-up of America’s
death row:  55.8% of the united States’ death row 
population is white, 41.9% is black and 2.3% is com-
prised of other races. Women make up only 1.7%,75
while men represent a staggering 98.3%.  The median
education level of death row inmates is 11th grade.76
8.4% of inmates had a prior homicide conviction, while
65.5% had prior felony convictions  half of all inmates
sentenced to death were between 20 to 29 years old at
the time of arrest; 11% were 19 or younger; and less
than 1% were 55 or older. The average age of a death
row inmate at the time of arrest is 28 years. Although
7,115 people were sentenced to death from 1977
through the end of 2006, only about 15% (1,057) have
actually been executed.77 From 1976 through the pres-
ent,78 1,111 inmates have been executed.  The following
is their statistical information:79 Race of the inmates:
631 white, 380 black, 76 hispanic, and 24 of other vary-
ing races. Race of the victims:  79% of murder victims
were white (even though whites comprise only half of
all murder victims), 15% black, 5% hispanic, and the
remaining 2% were composed of other racial groups.
Currently 3,309 inmates sit on death row in the
united States.80 California, Florida, Texas, Pennsylva-
nia, and Alabama have the most inmates on death row.81
The total number of prisoners on death row in these five
states is more than the remaining thirty-one states and
Federal Government combined.82 Texas, Virginia, Okla-
homa, Missouri, and Florida executed the most inmates
since 1976,83 executing more than twice the combined
total of the remaining thirty-one states and the federal
government.84 The rate of executions, however, has
fallen since the beginning of 2008.  There have been
only twelve executions in the united States since then,85
and this is likely due to the budget constraints faced by
each state in light of the current economic crisis, inas-
much as states cannot afford to prosecute death penalty
appeals to the united States Supreme Court.86
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In 1972, the united States Supreme Court de-
cided Furman v. Georgia, holding that the imposition of
the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment and violated the Constitution.87 The Court’s deci-
sion forced national and state legislatures to rethink their
statutes regarding capital offenses to ensure sentencing
courts did not administer the death penalty in a capri-
cious or discriminatory manner.88 This ruling effectively
vitiated death penalty statutes in each state.  Following
the ruling, thirty-eight state legislatures and the federal
government enacted new death penalty statutes in order
to comply with the mandate set forth in Furman.  The
line of cases below followed Furman, however, they ex-
ceeded the Court’s scope by creating bright line rules
which narrowed the states’ valid death penalty legisla-
tion.
Coker v. Georgia.
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not.  Life is over for the
victim of the murderer, for the rape vic-
tim, life may not be nearly so happy as it
was, but it is not over and normally is not
beyond repair.89
The above statement by the majority in Coker
reveals how the Court remains out of touch with the
people.  The dissent noted the existence of an “extreme
variation” in the crime of rape. Some perpetrators so
grievously physically and psychologically injure vic-
tims, that their lives are beyond repair, causing continual
suffering.  Murder victims’ suffering, on the other hand,
ends after the attack.90
The Supreme Court heard Coker after its ruling
in Gregg v. Georgia
when it held that the
imposition of death




lowed in the appli-
cation of the
statute.91 In Coker, the Court had to determine whether
a state could impose the death sentence on a defendant
convicted of raping an adult woman.92 The Defendant,
Coker, escaped from prison while serving sentences for
murder, rape, kidnapping and aggravated assault.93 Dur-
ing this escape Coker entered the home of elnita Carver,
tied up her husband, and raped her at knife point. The
trial court found Coker guilty and sentenced him to
death for the rape of an adult woman.94
Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens
concluded that the death sentence for the crime of rape
is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment
and, therefore, forbidden by the eighth Amendment.95
however, Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that
the death penalty in all circumstances is cruel and un-
usual punishment prohibited by the eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments.96 Justice Powell also concluded
that death is disproportionate punishment for the crime
of raping an adult woman when the perpetrator com-
mitted the crime without excessive brutality and the vic-
tim did not sustain any serious or lasting injury.97 The
majority stated in their opinion: 
[I]t is now settled that the death penalty
is not invariably cruel and unusual pun-
ishment within the meaning of the
eighth Amendment; it is not inherently
barbaric or an unacceptable mode of
punishment for crime; neither is it al-
ways disproportionate to the crime for
which it is imposed.98
To that end, the Court noted that attention must
be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular
sentence, history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and
the response of juries reflected in their sentencing deci-
sions are to be consulted.99
The Court went on to redefine the eighth
Amendment and noted: 
[T]he eighth Amendment bars not only
those punishments that are ‘barbaric’ but
also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation
to the crime committed, and a punish-
ment is excessive and unconstitutional if
it (1) makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than a purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suf-
fering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion
to the severity of the crime.100
The majority did not discount the seriousness of
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[Furman v. Georgia] 
effectively vitiated death 
penalty statutes 
in each state
The Court Narrows the Application of the Death
Penalty by Creating Bright Line Rules
rape as a crime.  Short of homicide, they regarded it as
the “ultimate violation of self,” as it inflicts mental and
psychological damage to the victim and it undermines
the community’s sense of security and therefore injures
the public.101 however, the Court stated no less than
eight times in its opinion that their decision pertained
solely to the rape of an adult woman.102 The Court con-
tended the rape of a child is likely deserving of a death
sentence.103
In dissent, Justice Powell emphasized how the
Majority consistently misquoted his dissent in Furman
v. Georgia.104 Powell reiterated that his opinion in Fur-
man emphasized the proportionality test regarding rape
should be applied on a case-by-case basis.  Specifically
Powell noted that, in some cases, the death penalty func-
tions as grossly excessive punishment while in others it
would not.105 Powell opposed creating bright line rules
because they tend to undermine the purpose of the Court
by drawing lines in the sand which should not apply in
every case.  Powell clarified by stating, “The deliberate
viciousness of the rapist may be greater than that of the
murderer. Rape is never an act committed accidentally.
Rarely can it be said to be unpremeditated. There also
is wide variation in the effect on the victim.”106 In a sep-
arate dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated that the
narrow issue here presented is whether the state of Geor-
gia may constitutionally execute this petitioner for the
particular rape which he has committed, in light of all
the facts and circumstances shown by this record.107
unlike the plurality, I would narrow the
inquiry in this case to the question actu-
ally presented: Does the eighth Amend-
ment’s ban against cruel and unusual
punishment prohibit the state of Georgia
from executing a person who has, within
the space of three years, raped three sep-
arate women, killing one and attempting
to kill another, who is serving prison
terms exceeding his probable lifetime
and who has not hesitated to escape con-
finement at the first available opportu-
nity?108
The Chief Justice continued by stating that once
the Court holds that the death penalty does not violate
the eighth Amendment,109 “it seriously impinges upon
the State’s legislative judgment to hold that it may not
impose such sentence upon an individual who has
shown total and repeated disregard for the welfare,
safety, personal integrity, and human worth of others,
and who seemingly cannot be deterred from continuing
such conduct.”110 Chief Justice Burger sent a clear mes-
sage that each crime must be independently judged and
that there can be no Constitutional cookbook approach
to death penalty cases.
Although the Supreme Court has cited Coker nu-
merous times as granting the Court power to narrow the
death penalty,111 this interpretation is overbroad.  The
majority in Coker was clear and unambiguous when it
held “that death is . . . a disproportionate penalty for the
. . . rap[e] of an adult woman;”112 this is supported by
objective evidence, as represented by the attitude of state
legislatures’ enactments and sentencing juries’ verdicts.
The Court confined its decision in such a manner be-
cause death as a punishment for the rape of an adult
woman without the taking of human life was excessive
“in its severity and revocability.”113 however, the Court
did allude to the fact that the imposition of the death
penalty in other non-homicide instances, such as child
rape, would be an appropriate application of capital pun-
ishment.114 In either instance, the Court shall consider
the enactments of the state legislatures and the verdicts
of the juries hearing those cases.  It is not the province
of the united States Supreme Court to legislate; rather,
its purpose is to interpret the law.  
Atkins v. Virginia.
It has been over twenty-five years since the
Court used its significant power to set a bright-line rule
limiting the application of the death penalty.115 however,
with its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the united States
Supreme Court has once again placed itself in the role
of legislator by limiting a state’s ability to define its own
boundaries under the eighth Amendment.  
Daryl Atkins was convicted of abduction, armed
robbery and capital murder, and was sentenced to
death.116 Atkins and another man abducted William
Jones at gunpoint in order to gain access to his auto-
mated teller bank account.117 After getting the money
they wanted, the duo took Jones to an isolated location
where they shot Jones eight times.118 Both Atkins and
his partner confirmed the story, except for a single dis-
crepancy: each said the other was the shooter.119 The
prosecution allowed Atkins’ accomplice to plead guilty
to first-degree murder in exchange for testimony against
Atkins, thus making the man ineligible for the death
penalty.120 Atkins was convicted of capital murder.121
During the penalty phase of his trial, Atkins called one
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witness to testify on his behalf—a forensic psychologist
who testified that Atkins had an IQ of fifty-nine and, as
such, he was considered “mentally retarded.”122
In response, the State presented an expert rebut-
tal witness, Dr. Samenow.123 Dr. Samenow evaluated
Atkins and found that he was a person “who chose to
pay attention sometimes, not to pay attention others, and
did poorly on the IQ test because he did not want to do
what he was required to do.”124 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed Atkins’ sentence and further noted that
Atkins did not argue “that his sentence was dispropor-
tionate to penalties imposed for similar crimes in Vir-
ginia, but instead contended that he [was] mentally
retarded and thus [could not] be sentenced to death.”125
The united States Supreme Court heard the case and
held that executions of mentally retarded criminals con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by
eighth Amendment.126
The Court noted that since its decision in Penry
v. Lynaugh,127
[A] significant number of states have
concluded that death is not a suitable
punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal, and similar bills have passed
at least one house in other states. . . .
[This] provides powerful evidence that
society today views mentally retarded
offenders as categorically less culpable
than the average criminal.128
The Court held that in this instance the punish-
ment is excessive and thus prohibited by the eighth
Amendment, and that an excessiveness claim must be
judged by “currently prevailing standards of decency.”129
The Court clarified this standard by stating “[i]t is not
so much the number of these states that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.”130
In delivering the opinion for the Court, Justice
Stevens stated that in the thirteen years since they de-
cided Penry v. Lynaugh, 
[T]he American public, legislators,
scholars, and judges have deliberated
over the question of whether the death
penalty should ever be imposed on a
mentally retarded criminal. The con-
sensus reflected in those deliberations
[gives the] answer to the question pre-
sented by this case: whether such exe-
cutions are “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” prohibited by the eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion.131
In determining how the Court should evaluate
the “evolving standards of decency,” the Justices noted
such decisions should be informed by “objective factors
to the maximum possible extent.”132 The Atkins Court
went on to note that the “clearest and most reliable ob-
jective evidence of contemporary values is the legisla-
tion enacted by the country’s legislatures and judgment
reached by its citizenry.”133 Thus the standard for eval-
uating the “evolving standards of decency,” in order to
determine “excessiveness” in sentencing is to consider
the states’ legislation and the jury verdicts in relation to
those laws enacted.  There is absolutely no mention that
the members of the Court should bring their own judg-
ment to bear when evaluating the actions of the various
state legislatures and their citizens,134 yet that is exactly
what has occurred.  
The Court appeared to be mitigating its bright-
line rule by leaving the door open for the states to inter-
pret what is meant by “mentally retarded.”135 Justice
Stevens wrote in his opinion:
not all people who claim to be mentally
retarded will be so impaired as to fall
within the range of mentally retarded of-
fenders about whom there is a national
consensus. . . . [W]e leave to the State[s]
the task of developing appropriate ways
to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences.136
This begs the question, what degree of mental
retardation is sufficient to satisfy an excessiveness claim
under the eighth Amendment?  It would seem as if the
Court left this door open for a reason.  Is it likely that
the dissent’s argument made too much sense to be ig-
nored?137 Or has the Court heeded the words of Chief
Justice Burger in his Coker dissent where he urged the
Court not to issue bright-line rules but to allow for an
eighth Amendment determination on a case-by-case
basis?138
Justice Antonin Scalia held in his dissent that
“today’s decision is the pinnacle of our eighth Amend-
ment death-is-different jurisprudence.”139 Scalia scorn-
fully wrote that the decision by the majority finds no
support in the text or the history of the eighth Amend-
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ment.140 “It does not even have support in current social
attitudes regarding the conditions that render an other-
wise just death penalty inappropriate.”141 he continued
by stating that “[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court
rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views
of its Members.”142 It is possible that this had an effect
on the Members of the Court as they decided to leave
the door open to the states to put in place their own stan-
dard for evaluating and determining mental retardation.
The death penalty is truly different because it
generally fosters finality: finality for the convicted and
finality for the victim and her fam-
ily.  however this finality is not
guaranteed in all circumstances, as
there is an apparent national con-
sensus that we, as a society, will
not execute those who are mentally
retarded because this type of pun-
ishment neither serves as a deter-
rent nor allows for retribution.
Although the Court created what
seems to be a bright-line rule, it
also realized the need for each state
to legislate itself.143 In doing so, the
Court created an escape valve that
offers a degree of state sovereignty.  The Court accom-
plished this by leaving to the states the task of develop-
ing appropriate ways to evaluate and determine the level
of mental retardation that would allow a defendant to
escape the application of that state’s death penalty.  
Roper v. Simmons.
“We can get away with murder, because 
we are minors.”144
The Supreme Court of the united States has seen
fit to narrow the application of the death penalty for the
second time in three years.  In 2005, Roper v. Simmons
abrogated the law set forth sixteen years prior in Stan-
ford v. Kentucky,145 where the Court sanctioned the im-
position of the death penalty for offenders who were at
least sixteen years of age at the time of the crime.146 Did
the public consensus change during the sixteen years be-
tween Roper and Stanford, or did the Court’s make-up
change?147 Justice Kennedy noted that the public con-
sensus supported the Roper decision.148 he claimed to
have applied a standard first set in Trop v. Dulles, later
clarified in Coker v. Georgia and Atkins v. Virginia, that
state legislation and jury decisions should prevail; how-
ever, here there was clearly no such national consensus
or trend.149
Christopher Simmons was a seventeen-year-old
high school junior when he formulated a plan to commit
burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up
a victim and throwing the victim off a bridge.150 he en-
listed the help of two friends, who were fifteen and six-
teen, respectively.151 “Simmons assured his friends that
they could ‘get away with it’ because they were mi-
nors.”152 he identified his victim from a previous car
accident, and, at 2 a.m., Simmons and his accomplices
entered Shirley Crook’s home.153
They bound her with duct tape, cov-
ered her eyes and mouth, and drove
her to a state park where they pro-
ceeded to throw her from a railroad
bridge into the Meramec River,
drowning her.154 Following this hor-
rific act, Simmons bragged to his
friends about his cold, calculated
murder, confessed to police, and
performed a reenactment of the mur-
der on videotape.155 Subsequently,
Simmons was found guilty of capital
murder and, after finding three ag-
gravating factors, the jury recommended the death
penalty.156 In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy held
that the eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited
the execution of individuals who were under the age of
eighteen at the time of their capital crimes.157
The Court relied on its decision in Trop v. Dulles,
as it explained in Atkins v. Virginia, that the Court must
consider the evolving standards of decency, which re-
flect the gradual maturation of society, in order to de-
termine which punishments are disproportionate and in
violation of the eighth Amendment.  While Justice
Kennedy points to the Court’s ruling in Atkins for sup-
port, it is simply not analogous.  In Atkins, there were
actual indicia of a national consensus rejecting the use
of the death penalty against mentally retarded individu-
als.158 The Atkins Court pointed out that since their de-
cision in Penry, more than nineteen states and the
Federal Government changed their death penalty
statutes to eliminate those deemed mentally retarded
from death penalty eligibility.159 That; however, was not
the case in Roper.  When the Court decided Stanford,
there were twenty-two states that allowed executions of
those who were under eighteen years old.  When the
Court decided Roper, only two states had changed their
views.160 In what world does a change of less than 10%
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When the Court decided
Roper, only two states had
changed their views.160 In
what world does a change of
less than 10% form a major-
ity or trend, let alone indicia
of national consensus? It
simply does not. 
form a majority or trend, let alone indicia of national
consensus?  It simply does not.  
This urges the question: if no national consensus
can be determined from legislative trends, then on what
basis did the united States Supreme Court see fit to re-
strict the application of valid state legislation?  Could it
be affected by outside influences or are the Justices sim-
ply imparting their personal opinions in the decision?161
Why create such a bright-line rule?  even though the
Atkins Court created such a rule, it did so with an actual
national consensus and it also allowed for interpretation
and alteration in the rule’s application by granting states
the ability to define mental retardation.162 The Court
thus tempered the bright-line rule against the states’
need for self-governance.  If there was ever an instance
where the Court should allow for such leeway, it is here. 
Justice Kennedy clearly notes that such a bright-
line rule is fraught with problems, yet he held that a line
must be drawn.163 he stated that:
Drawing the line at eighteen years of age
is subject, of course, to the objections al-
ways raised against categorical rules.
The qualities that distinguish juveniles
from adults do not disappear when an in-
dividual turns eighteen. By the same
token, some under eighteen have already
attained a level of maturity some adults
will never reach.164
This is certainly an area that needs no bright-line rule,
and, as Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Coker noted,
these types of rulings should be made on a case-by-case
basis and should be fact driven.165
Justice O’Connor has not changed her stance on
the execution of those under eighteen years of age.166
She formed part of the majority in Stanford v. Kentucky,
which ruled that the application of the death penalty to
those who were sixteen and seventeen years old was not
violative of the eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.167 In her dissent, O’Con-
nor stated: 
The Court’s decision today establishes a
categorical rule forbidding the execution
of any offender for any crime committed
before his 18th birthday, no matter how
deliberate, wanton, or cruel the offense.
neither the objective evidence of con-
temporary societal values, nor the
Court’s moral proportionality analysis,
nor the two in tandem suffice to justify
this ruling.168
Justice O’Connor specifically noted that the majority
“refrains from asserting that its holding is compelled by
a genuine national consensus.”169 Further, she stated: 
The Court has adduced no evidence im-
peaching the seemingly reasonable con-
clusion reached by many state
legislatures: that at least some 17-year-
old murderers are sufficiently mature to
deserve the death penalty in an appropri-
ate case. nor has it been shown that cap-
ital sentencing juries are incapable of
accurately assessing a youthful defen-
dant’s maturity or of giving due weight
to the mitigating characteristics associ-
ated with youth.170
Justice O’Connor ended her dissent by noting
that “‘the day may come when . . . a clear national con-
sensus can be said to have developed’” when there is an
actual legislative rejection of applying capital punish-
ment to sixteen- or seventeen-year-old murderers; how-
ever, she concludes that “that day has not yet arrived.”171
“Words have no meaning if the views of less
than 50% of death penalty states can constitute a na-
tional consensus.”172 Responding to the majority’s find-
ing that a state’s act of abandoning its death penalty
would be considered part of a national consensus op-
posing the juvenile death penalty, 173 Justice Scalia stated:
“In an attempt to keep afloat its implausible assertion
of national consensus, the Court throws overboard a
proposition well-established in our eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.”174 Scalia, who was joined by Justice
Thomas and the Chief Justice, noted that a more consis-
tent approach would be to determine how many states
permit sixteen- and seventeen-year -old offenders to be
treated as adults with respect to noncapital offenses.175
The dissent answers the ultimate question of
how the Court came to create such a bright-line rule with
no reasonable indicia of a national consensus.  Justice
Scalia would have held that the driving force behind the
majority’s decision was not the action of a few state leg-
islatures, but the Court’s “own judgment” that a mur-
derer who is under eighteen years old can never be as
morally culpable as his older counterparts.176 Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist admonished the majority
30 Criminal Law Brief
for supplanting the consensus of the American people
with the views of a few united States Supreme Court
Justices.177
The Court took this opportunity to create another
bright-line rule, which serves to limit the application of
the death penalty.  This is not a rule based on solid
ground, nor is it a rule based in Constitutional Law.  It
is a rule based on the morals and personal judgment of
five human beings.  The Court has seen fit, with the
Roper ruling, to tell the legislators of our fifty states that
their carefully drafted laws, which reflect the true con-
sensus of the people of this country, do not matter.  With
this decision, the Court’s majority used its considerable
power to rewrite legislation in a large number of sover-
eign states without concern for a national consensus or
actual public opinion.  This is simply not within the
power granted to the united States Supreme Court.
Kennedy v. Louisiana.
An eight-year-old girl cried out in agony, wear-
ing only a t-shirt and wrapped in a bloody blanket.178
An expert in pediatric forensic medicine declared that
her injuries, which resulted from a sexual assault, were
the most severe he had seen in all his years in practice.179
The vicious attack caused such severe damage that it re-
quired the victim to endure emergency vaginal and rec-
tal surgery.180 Shockingly, the attack was not at the
hands of a stranger, but by the child’s caregiver and pro-
tector—her stepfather.181 Patrick Kennedy was con-
victed and sentenced to death under Louisiana’s child
rape law.182
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion and concluded that the eighth Amendment pro-
hibits the application of the death penalty for the rape
of a child where the crime does not result in the victim’s
death.183 The opinion notes that capital punishment
must be reserved for those criminals “who commit ‘a
narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of
execution.’”184 Assuming that a brutal child rape cannot
be as severe as murder, Justice Kennedy clarified the
Court’s opinion regarding the relative severity of child
rape, noting that although child rape may be devastating,
it cannot compare to the moral depravity and severity
of murder.185
In numerous areas of the opinion, Kennedy
quotes from Coker v. Georgia, but ignores the reasoning
that surrounds the precise wording of the Court’s deci-
sion.  The Coker Court stated—no fewer than eight
times—that the death penalty is violative of the eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment when applied to the crime of rape of an adult
woman.186 The Coker Court left open the question of
whether the death penalty could be imposed as punish-
ment for child rape, and the Louisiana State Supreme
Court reasoned that children are a class that requires a
special level of protection because of the significant
harm that is created when a child is raped and that, short
of first degree murder, there is no crime more deserving
of death.187
The reasoning in Kennedy certainly cannot be
related to a national consensus or trend.188 Both Roper
and Atkins clearly state that it is “the consistency of the
direction of change” rather than the numerical count that
is significant when deciding whether a change in public
opinion would cause the application of the death penalty
to be considered unconstitutional.189
Since Louisiana enacted its statute190 authorizing
the use of the death penalty in child rape cases, four
other states have followed suit with similar legislation,
and at least eight others have authorized capital punish-
ment for other non-homicide crimes.191 The Kennedy
majority turned a blind-eye to this trend of making child
rape a capital crime and held that because forty-four
states had not made child rape a capital crime, the na-
tional consensus is that child rape should not be a capital
crime.192 In this instance, the Court ignored its own doc-
trine by neglecting to analyze the national trend regard-
ing child rape statutes.193
The majority noted that instead of creating a
bright-line rule, it could do what was done with murder
offenses and narrow the class of aggravating circum-
stances eligible to be considered during sentencing in
capital cases.194 however, rather than instituting such a
viable alternative, the majority held that it was too “dif-
ficult to identify standards that would guide the decision
maker so that the penalty would not be imposed in an
arbitrary manner but would be “reserved for the most
severe cases of child rape.”195 The united States
Supreme Court found it too difficult to investigate and
set standards that would narrow the scope of the death
penalty in child rape cases, while keeping the legislation
alive.  That the Court, by a slim majority, declined to
take the opportunity to set forth standards carving out
an exception for severe cases of child rape causes one
to speculate that the Court impermissibly supplanted the
will of the people for its own judgment.  
Finally, the majority addressed the issue of de-
terrence, reasoning that because child sexual abuse is
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underreported, and because a victim may want to protect
her assailant from the potential of receiving the death
penalty, allowing capital punishment would ultimately
increase the risk of non-reporting and diminish the
penalty’s objectives.196 however, it is that the feelings
of shame and self-blame that victims of child sexual
abuse feel is what most often leads victims to refrain
from reporting their abuse.197 The offender’s punish-
ment is rarely, if ever, taken into account, assuming the
child even knows enough to consider it.198 Given the
uncertainty surrounding deterrence of child rape, it ap-
pears as if the majority is legislating from the bench in-
stead of objective evaluating the law.
The dissent addressed the majority’s argument
that it is “not feasible to channel the exercise of sentenc-
ing discretion in child-rape cases.”199 Justice Alito stated
that this concern does not provide a basis for striking
down every child rape law without considering the
scope and application of those laws.200 In other words,
the Court has no cause to issue bright-line rules that un-
necessarily create sweeping
changes.  The states are perfectly
capable of self-rule and determin-
ing the scope and applicability of
their legislation.  
Justice Alito was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Scalia and Thomas in his dissent.201
The Justices make it abundantly
clear that the majority’s reasoning
is flawed and does not support a
finding that Louisiana’s child rape
law is unconstitutional.202 Justice
Alito points out that although the majority indicates the
presence of a national consensus that the death penalty
is never acceptable for the crime of child rape, he con-
tends that it is not supported by sound reasoning.203 Fur-
ther, Alito cautions the majority when substituting its
opinion for that of the people by allowing their “inde-
pendent judgment” to strike down a law that the state of
Louisiana found constitutional.204 The dissent holds that
the “objective indicia” of our society’s “evolving stan-
dards of decency” in this matter are summarized as fol-
lows:  “neither Congress nor juries have done anything
that can plausibly be interpreted as evidencing the ‘na-
tional consensus’ that the Court perceives.”205 While the
dissent is not suggesting that six new state laws create a
national consensus, they are stating the Court has held
that it is not the number but the trend that determines a
consensus and that it is apparent more states have en-
acted statutes making child rape a death eligible crime
than those that have passed legislation forbidding the
use of capital punishment in child rape cases since the
Coker.   The Court obscured a developing trend permit-
ting the death penalty for child rape and implemented
its “own judgment” regarding the death penalty rather
than respecting the will of the state legislatures.  
Finally, the dissent notes that the Louisiana leg-
islature, and those states following suit, determined that
the immaturity and vulnerability of a child add a devas-
tating dimension to rape that is not present in the rape
of an adult.206 It is this harm that justifies the imposition
of the death penalty.207 Justice Scalia declared that the
majority provided no legitimate explanation for why the
state legislature should be overruled and that bold ref-
erences to “decency,” “moderation,” and “moral judg-
ment” are simply not enough to declare a state law
unconstitutional.208
In addition, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg re-
minded the Court that Coker was decided by only a plu-
rality and that Justice Powell’s
separate concurrence left open
the prospect that death could be
imposed for rape in extreme cir-
cumstances, even in cases where
the victim did not die.209 During
oral argument, Ginsburg noted
that states might not be passing
laws like Louisiana’s because
they were interpreting Coker to
limit the death penalty to homi-
cides: “Coker seems to cover the
waterfront, and we cannot know
if there is a consensus… until this Court clarifies what
Coker stands for.”210
Justice Breyer, also during oral argument,
brought up a legendary legal argument: the slippery
slope.211 he suggested that if the Court were to uphold
a death sentence where the victim was not killed, states
would begin enacting legislation making any horrific act
a capital crime.212 however, this is not the case, as states
have had the ability to write those types of laws prior to
this decision and they have been quite restrained in their
capital crime legislation.  It is a weak argument that,
should Louisiana’s law be deemed constitutional, other
states would jump to enact legislature authorizing the
death penalty in crimes that, in the view of the Court,
do not warrant capital punishment.
Chief Justice Roberts brought the case back to
the issue of “national consensus,” making it quite clear
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The Court obscured a develop-
ing trend permitting the death
penalty for child rape and im-
plemented its “own judgment”
regarding the death penalty
rather than respecting the will
of the state legislatures.  
that he did not see a consensus against Louisiana’s child
rape law and, in fact, he suggested the trend is in favor
of such a law.213 he stated that “more and more states
are passing statutes imposing the death penalty in situ-
ations that do not result in death.”214
There can be little doubt that the slim majority
has decided this case based on their “own judgment”
and not on “objective indicia” of “national consensus.”
If the Court had truly relied on the standard set in Trop
v. Dulles they would have reviewed the enactments of
the various state legislatures and found that since
Louisiana enacted this statute, there have been more
states that have enacted similar legislation than those
that have rejected such proposals.  Further, the decision
of the Louisiana Supreme Court indicates the painstak-
ing lengths it went to in analyzing this case and deter-
mining that the jury made the correct decision.  Since
the two-part test for “evolving standards of decency” in-
cludes evaluating the legislative actions of the various
states and reviewing the decisions of those juries, it is
abundantly clear that the Kennedy Court substituted its
moral judgment and opinion for that of the people in an
ongoing crusade to narrow the application of the death
penalty in the united States.  
Our task is not to give effect to our in-
dividual views on capital punishment;
rather, we must determine what the
Constitution permits a state to do under
its reserved powers. Chief Justice
Burger. 215
Chief Justice Burger wrote in Coker v. Georgia
that the special circumstances and facts which bear di-
rectly on whether the death penalty should be imposed
must be derived from each individual instance and not
from an overbroad bright-line rule.216 In other words,
the Justices of the Supreme Court of the united States
should strive to enforce the states’ legislation by viewing
each case as a separate and distinct entity and not a
broad area of law that can be corralled by a single, to-
tally encompassing rule.   
Retribution and deterrence are consistently held
to be the two distinct purposes served by the death
penalty.217 Society regularly produces individuals who
commit horrific crimes that go beyond the bounds of
normal imagination—the kinds of crimes that allow
most of us to accept the use of capital punishment in cer-
tain cases.218 however, when capital punishment is
viewed as a whole, we are struck with the stark truth of
erroneous convictions, DnA evidence exonerations as
well as the issues of bias and racism.219 It is this truth
that has led some people who would normally support
the death penalty to condemn it completely,220 and, in-
deed, “[t]he power of this paradox is tearing apart the
Supreme Court.”221 For this reason it is important to
clarify the Supreme Court justices’ views on capital pun-
ishment.222
Justice John Paul Stevens
John Paul Stevens was nominated to the
Supreme Court by President Gerald Ford in 1975.223 Al-
though Stevens was appointed by a Republican Presi-
dent and was an antitrust lawyer, he has seemingly
strayed away from the conservative nature that led the
party to place him on the Court.224 Stevens’ individual-
istic personality places him on the outside of the Court’s
mainstream and many have pointed out that he is quirky
and has an unconventional view of jurisprudence.225
This can be seen in his various opinions.  
When writing about the death penalty in Baze v.
Rees,226 Justice Stevens argued that in the absence of a
causal relation, “deterrence cannot serve as a sufficient
penological justification for this uniquely severe and ir-
revocable punishment.”227 Professor Cass Sunstein228
provided a note of caution to Justice Stevens when he
said, “the absence of evidence of deterrence should not
be confused with evidence of absence.”229
Justice Stevens directed the Court in Atkins v.
Virginia that a “national consensus” is determined not
so much by the number of states for or against the death
penalty, but by the consistency of the direction of change
that is occurring in the state legislatures.230 he wrote
the majority opinion using the “national consensus”
doctrine as called for by the Court in Trop v. Dulles231
and applied in Coker v. Georgia.232 however, he added
the consistency of change theory to the Trop doctrine.
In particular, Stevens stated that “consistency of direc-
tion of change” led the court to reverse its own long-
standing support of capital punishment for those with
significant mental retardation.233 Yet when a similar
“consistency of direction” was noted in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, he discounted such a change in direction and
sided with the majority that prohibited the application
of the death penalty for child rapists.234 Justice Stevens
could be using his senior status on the Court to act as a
How the Justices Are Divided 
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legislator, even though he wrote in Gregg v. Georgia
that, “the requirements of the eighth Amendment must
be applied with an awareness of the limited role to be
played by the courts, and that we may not act as judges
as we might as legislators.”235 It is this type of incon-
sistency that has led commentators to label Justice
Stevens “quirky.”  
Justice Stevens has made his position abun-
dantly clear.  The eighty-eight year old jurist was one of
the authors of Gregg v. Georgia, which supported the
re-instatement of the death penalty in 1976.236 however,
Stevens is now of the belief that the death penalty is un-
constitutional in every instance due to procedural and
fairness problems.237 he has clearly noted that his time
on the Court has convinced him that legislators choose
to retain the death penalty because of habit rather than
putting forth a deliberate process that “balances costs
and risks.”238
Justice Antonin Scalia
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who has
been called one of the most colorful jurists on the bench,
“defies simple characterization.”239 Justice Scalia has
been quoted as saying that he agonizes over the fact that
his duty often forces him to do things that he just does
not want to do.240 At the time of his appointment by
President Ronald Reagan, Justice Scalia was the
youngest justice on the Court, but that did not stop him
from stating his philosophy of strict interpretation and
judicial restraint.241
Justice Scalia has been firm in his stance on the
Court.  he has held, and continues to hold, that the per-
sonal views of justices are not a valid consideration
when making decisions that go against the will of the
people as noted through the enactments of their duly
elected representatives.242 Scalia wrote in his dissent in
Atkins that, “[s]eldom has an opinion of this Court rested
so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its
members.”243 he concluded as such because “rarely if
ever [will it] be the case that the Members of this Court
will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the
American people than do their elected representa-
tives.”244 In other words, the justices should not apply
their “own judgment” when deciding cases that involve
valid determinations by state legislators; they must side
with the will of the people.
In January, 2002, Justice Scalia spoke at the uni-
versity of Chicago’s Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life.  he was joined by Beth Wilkinson, the lead pros-
ecutor in the Timothy McVeigh245 trial, and was quoted
as saying, “You want to have a fair death penalty?  You
kill; you die.  That’s fair. You wouldn’t have any of these
problems about, you know, you kill a white person, you
kill a black person.  You want to make it fair? You kill;
you die.”246
In his dissent in Atkins, Justice Scalia concludes
that the majority’s opinion adds another impediment to
the legitimate application of the death penalty, and in
doing so they simply pile on substantive and procedural
requirements in order to invent a “death is different” ju-
risprudence.247 This is quite closely followed up by his
dissent in Roper v. Simmons, where Scalia reaffirms his
support for the death penalty:
We must disregard the new reality that,
to the extent our eighth Amendment de-
cisions constitute something more than
a show of hands on the current Justices’
current personal views about penology,
they purport to be nothing more than a
snapshot of American public opinion at
a particular point in time . . . We must
treat these decisions just as though they
represented real law, real prescriptions
democratically adopted by the American
people, as conclusively . . .  construed
by this Court.248
Scalia concluded by noting that if the Court were
to update the eighth Amendment any time the Justices’
personal opinions changed, it would destroy stability
and make case law an unreliable basis for states to de-
sign laws and to effectively represent the will of the cit-
izenry.249 Justice Scalia fully supports the right of the
states to enact their own legislation, and believes that,
in creating bright-line rules, the Court interferes with
state sovereignty.   Being an originalist and textualist,
Justice Scalia holds true to the text of the Constitution
and, in doing so, firmly supports the states application
of the death penalty.250
Justice Anthony Kennedy
Anthony Kennedy was not President Reagan’s
planned nominee for the Court.251 After two failed nom-
inations, Reagan’s administration needed a nominee that
would sail through the Congressional confirmation
process and edwin Meese recommended Kennedy, who
was then sitting on the ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.252
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During the time he spent with the ninth Circuit,
Kennedy held steady to his “case-by-case” approach and
refused to make bright-line rules.253 he has proven to
be a pivotal member of the Supreme Court and, often
times, close decisions turn on his vote.254 Yet, it has be-
come apparent that
his time on the
Court has eroded
the standards he
held firm when he
was on the court of
appeals.







tucky255 with that of
Roper v. Sim-
mons.256 Justice Kennedy had been on the Court only a
year, when he sided with the majority in Stanford in
1989 and held that the death penalty was not violative
of the eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment and those who commit murder
at age sixteen and seventeen could be sentenced to
death.257 he went on to agree with Justice Antonin
Scalia, and together they declared, “we emphatically re-
ject petitioner’s suggestion that the issues in this case
permit us to apply our ‘own informed judgment,’ . . . re-
garding the desirability of permitting the death penalty
for crimes by 16- and 17-year-olds.”258
Less than two decades later, however, Justice
Kennedy reversed his position when writing the deci-
sion in Roper.  In that decision, Kennedy found that the
application of the death penalty to those less than eight-
een years old was violative of the eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.259 he
argued, “[w]e then must determine, in the exercise of
our own independent judgment, whether the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”
260 This is the exact proposition that Kennedy emphati-
cally rejected in Stanford. It would appear from this ex-
ample that Justice Kennedy has left behind his
“case-by-case” approach and abandoned his opposition
to creating bright-line rules, which has recently included
limiting the states’ ability to enact comprehensive death
penalty legislation.
Justice David Souter
Justice David Souter joined the Supreme Court
in 1990, after being nominated by President George
h.W. Bush.261 he was relatively unknown due to the
fact that he had only served five months on the u.S.
Court of Appeals before being elevated to the Supreme
Court.262 Conservatives believed that Souter was a re-
strained jurist who would bolster the right wing of the
Court, held then by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist.263
however, Souter did not fall in line with Scalia and
Rehnquist, or the Court’s right bloc.  he has formed a
centrist bloc, and often stands in opposition of the con-
servative right.264
Justice Souter’s view of the death penalty can be
made no clearer than his own words in Kansas v.
Marsh.265 In that dissent, Souter called the Kansas death
penalty law “morally absurd,”266 and that when consid-
ering the hazards of death penalty prosecution as well
as the reality of DnA exonerations, it creates broad
doubt as to the validity of the death penalty itself.267
Justice Souter has taken every opportunity presented to
him to narrow the application of the death penalty
among the states.  he cast a vote creating bright-line
rules against capital punishment in Atkins v. Virginia,
Roper v. Simmons, and most recently in Kennedy v.
Louisiana.  From his voting history, Justice David
Souter appears to be more centrist than conservative and
is not a supporter of the death penalty.
Justice Clarence Thomas
Justice Clarence Thomas, who is best known for
not asking any questions during oral arguments, was ap-
pointed to the Court by President George h.W. Bush in
1991.268 Thomas is currently the only black member of
the united States Supreme Court and the second black
member in united States history.269 There are those that
posit he was chosen only because of his color in an ef-
fort to replace the retired Thurgood Marshall.270 how-
ever, President Bush has stated that Thomas was chosen
because of his outstanding legal qualifications.271 Justice
Thomas has closely aligned himself with the far right of
the Court.272 he has been referred to as “Scalia junior,”
a nickname indicating his frequent unwavering concur-
rences with the outspoken Justice Antonin Scalia.273
Although Clarence Thomas has not spoken
often, he made his views clear on the death penalty.  In
Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice Thomas, along with Jus-
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which vehemently opposed to the majority’s imposition
of a “blanket rule” barring the death penalty, especially
when the specific facts and circumstances of the case
are not considered.274 Further, during his Senate confir-
mation hearings, Senator Strom Thurmond asked Justice
Thomas about his views on the death penalty.275 Justice
Thomas stated: 
The death penalty is the harshest penalty
that can be imposed, and it is certainly
one that is unchangeable. And we should
be most concerned about providing all
the rights and all the due process that
can be provided and should be provided
to individuals who may face that kind of
a consequence.  I would be concerned,
of course, that we would move too fast,
that if we eliminate some of the protec-
tions that perhaps we may deprive that
individual of his life without due
process.  I believe that there should be
reasonable restrictions at some point.276
There is no ambiguity in Justice Thomas’s
words, he stands firm in favor of the death penalty, while
still providing a defendant due process of law.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
President Bill Clinton’s first appointment to the
united States Supreme Court was Ruth Bader Gins-
burg.277 Ginsburg was elevated to the Court from the
D.C. Circuit to replace retiring Justice Byron White.278
Although known as a liberal, Ginsburg has not hesitated
to vote with the Court’s right.279 however, Justice Gins-
burg is in favor of abolishing the death penalty.280 She
has stated that “she supports a proposed state morato-
rium on the death penalty, adding that accused murder-
ers with good lawyers ‘do not get the death penalty.’”
281 Ginsburg further noted that our justice system oper-
ates best when opposing positions are well represented,
and that is typically not the case with death eligible
crimes.282 As with Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Souter,
Justice Ginsburg is steadfast in her opposition of the
death penalty.
Justice Stephen Breyer
Although a Democrat, Stephen Breyer was ap-
pointed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals by Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan and elevated to the Supreme Court
in 1994 by President Bill Clinton.283 Justice Breyer
states that he takes a pragmatic approach to constitu-
tional issues, as he is more interested in coherence and
continuity in the law, rather than following textual stric-
tures.285 This often places him directly in opposition of
Justice Scalia and his textual philosophy.285 no place is
this opposition more clear than on the issue of the death
penalty.  
Justice Breyer has taken every opportunity to de-
velop bright-line rules for the restriction of the death
penalty.  he voted with the majority in deciding that the
death penalty should not be applied in cases involving
the mentally retarded,286 those who committed capital
murder when under eighteen years old,287 and when the
crime does not result in the death of the victim.288 Justice
Breyer stated during oral arguments in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, that if the Court were to uphold a law which
permitted the imposition of death for a crime in which
the victim was not killed, it would create a “slippery
slope” inviting legislatures throughout the united States
to make capital crimes out of anything they thought was
horrible.289 While Justice Breyer does not go as far as
to call for the abolition of the death penalty, as many on
the Court’s left do, he does favor its restriction to only
allow for the imposition of death when the victim of a
crime has died, no matter how horrific that crime may
be.290 Therefore, it is quite likely that Justice Breyer will
continue to vote in favor of restricting the application
of the death penalty.
Chief Justice Roberts
John G. Roberts, Jr. was confirmed as the sev-
enteenth Chief Justice of the united States Supreme
Court on September 29, 2005.291 Roberts became the
second youngest Chief Justice since John Marshall.292
According to Professor Cass Sunstein, Chief Justice
Roberts is a “judicial minimalist,” who emphasizes re-
spect for judicial precedent.293 Roberts is entrenched,
however, in the conservative bloc of the Court’s right,
and often votes with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito.294
In joining the dissent of Justice Alito in Kennedy
v. Louisiana, the Chief Justice made his position on the
death penalty perfectly clear.295 The dissent argued that
the death penalty is constitutional and does not violate
the eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.296 Further, the dissent argued that
the “independent judgment” of the Members of the
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Court has no place in Constitutional decisions.297 The
dissent was also quick to point out to the majority in
Kennedy that there was no “national consensus” running
against Louisiana’s child rape law and, in fact, an oppo-
site trend in support of such laws could be found.298
When considering Chief Justice Roberts’ young age, it
is quite conceivable that he will lead the Court for the
next few decades.  Additionally, he will probably remain
on the right of the Court and stand firm in his support
of the death penalty.
Justice Samuel Alito
President George W. Bush made his second
nomination to the u.S. Supreme Court when he chose a
judge from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Samuel
A. Alito, Jr.299 Justice Alito aligns himself with the
Court’s right and credits conservative writings criticiz-
ing the Warren Court’s decisions in areas of criminal
procedure, the establishment Clause, and reapportion-
ment, as his motivation for attending law school.300
Although very few death penalty cases were
heard during his tenure with the Third Circuit, Justice
Alito made sure that he was personally involved in
every aspect of those decisions.301 Before his nomina-
tion, few people knew his views on the death penalty.302
however, Senator Feingold said of Justice Alito, “I
found a person who actually thought about it deeply,
who was troubled by innocent people being sentenced
to death, and who gave particular concern to how those
[death penalty] cases were handled as a Court of Ap-
peals judge.”303
Justice Alito supports the application of the
death penalty by the states and is against the formulation
of bright line rules that serve to restrict such state legis-
lation.  In his dissent in Kennedy v. Louisiana, Alito
noted that the majority was usurping the work of state
Legislators, as the Court could provide no cogent expla-
nation as to why the Louisiana law should be overrid-
den.304 he notes that “[c]onclusory references to
‘decency,’ ‘moderation,’ ‘restraint,’ ‘full progress’ and
‘moral judgment’ are not enough.”305 Furthermore, he
directs the majority to defer to the judgment of
Louisiana and a growing number of other states.306 In
addition, he emphasizes that the harm caused to the vic-
tims of child rape and to society as a whole is grave.307
he concludes by declaring that these considerations rep-
resent the true “national consensus.”308
Justice Alito could not have been clearer in his
belief that the decision was purely a question for law-
makers, not Supreme Court Justices, stating that309 “[t]he
Court is willing to block the potential emergence of a
national consensus in favor of permitting the death
penalty for child rape because, in the end, what matters
is the Court’s ‘own judgment’ regarding ‘the acceptabil-
ity of the death penalty.’”310 In his clear and unambigu-
ous statements, Justice Alito has reaffirmed his
conservative posture and his position on the Court’s
right.  Given his young age and his vigor for the u.S.
Constitution, it is likely that Justice Alito will remain on
the Court for quite some time and will help to prevent
the Court from further narrowing the application of the
death penalty.
The united States Supreme Court is clearly di-
vided on the issue of the death penalty.  On the far left
are Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg who firmly
believe that the death penalty should be restricted or
abolished.311 Towards the middle are Justices Breyer
and Kennedy.  Justice Breyer has stated that he believes
that there should be no application of the death penalty
unless the crime results in the death of the victim.312 Jus-
tice Kennedy has proclaimed himself to be the swing
vote in matters concerning the death penalty; however,
this is far from accurate.313 Justice Kennedy has aban-
doned his “case-by-case” approach, and is now siding
with the Court’s left in creating bright-line rules that
serve to narrow the application of the death penalty.  his
votes in Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v. Simmons, and
Kennedy v. Louisiana clearly paint Kennedy as someone
who is not a supporter of the states’ right to enact com-
prehensive death penalty legislation.  For all his postur-
ing and statements, Justice Kennedy completes the
majority the Court requires to continue restricting the
application of capital punishment.
While on the Court’s far right is the ever present
Justice Scalia, he is consistently joined by Justice
Thomas in their support of state legislatures and their
right to enact comprehensive death penalty legisla-
tion.314 Justice Alito, being the newest member of the
Court, has not had the opportunity to weigh in on the
death penalty as Scalia and Thomas have, but his voice
was clear in his dissent in Kennedy v. Louisiana.  Alito
is a firm supporter of the death penalty, as well as the
states’ right to enact comprehensive capital punishment
legislation.315 Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts is clearly
aligned with the Court’s right.316 his views on the death
penalty are expressed by the fact that he joined the dis-
sent in Kennedy, which admonished the majority for
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supplanting the will of the people, with its “own judg-
ment” in matters concerning the application of state cap-
ital punishment legislation.317
Although this represents the make-up of the
Court today, it is very likely to change in the near future.
Justice John Paul Stevens is 88 years old, followed by
Justice Ginsburg at 76 years old.318 The average age of
the three remaining members of the Court’s left is 70.319
Compare this with the Court’s right.  Justice Scalia is 72
and is likely to follow the path taken by former Chief
Justice Rehnquist, which means he will be on the bench
for quite some time.320 however, the average age of the
three remaining Justices on the Court’s right is only
58.321 It is safe to assume that the Court’s right will stay
in place for at least the next decade or two.  Given these
statistics, the Court’s continued narrowing of the appli-
cation of the death penalty may be halted with a single
new appointment to the Court.
On May 1, 2009 Justice David Souter sent a let-
ter to President Barack Obama indicating his plans to
retire from the Court in June, 2009 when the Court be-
gins summer recess.322 On May 26, 2009 President
Obama nominated appeals court judge Sonia Sotomayor
to replace David Souter as an Associate Justice on the
united States Supreme Court.323
Judge Sotomayor has been involved with the
federal judicial system for over 18 years.324 Sotomayor
was originally appointed to the bench as a u.S. District
Court for the Southern District of new York, and is cur-
rently an Appellate Court Judge on the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals.325 her rulings during her tenure as a
judge have leaned toward the left and she is often re-
ferred to as a “liberal judge.”326 In a March, 1981
memo, while working with the Puerto Rican Legal De-
fense and education Fund, Sotomayor wrote “Capital
Punishment is associated with evident racism in our so-
ciety. . . . The number of minorities and the poor exe-
cuted or awaiting execution is out of proportion to their
numbers in the population.”327 It appears that So-
tomayor, if confirmed, would stand in as a direct re-
placement for David Souter when it comes to the
narrowing of the state’s application of the death penalty.
When people begin to believe that organ-
ized society is unwilling or unable to im-
pose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are
sown the seeds of anarchy – of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law. 
- Justice Potter Stewart328
The Fifth Amendment to the united States’ Con-
stitution reads:  
no person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; . . . nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . .329
From this clear and unambiguous statement
comes the basis for our death penalty legislation.  Our
founding fathers undoubtedly understood that certain
crimes would require the application of capital punish-
ment, otherwise they would not have so clearly ad-
dressed it.  This amendment solidifies the fact that
certain acts will fall into the category of capital crimes.
In such instances, no person shall be deprived of their
life at the hands of the government without due process
of law.  This Constitutional amendment purposely tem-
pers the application of the death penalty with the man-
date of due process and therefore serves as an inherent
check on death penalty legislation of the states.  Thus,
there can be no cause to allow the Justices of the
Supreme Court to interject their “own judgment” into
such matters and in effect narrow the scope of valid state
legislation.  
If we were to allow the Justices to continue
along such a path, then who would speak for the sexu-
ally abused eight year old girls of our Country?  The
“evolving standard of decency” doctrine put forth in
Trop v. Dulles holds that claims of excessive punishment
must be determined using the standards of decency that
currently prevail.330 Contemporary society holds that
children constitute a class of people who need special
protection because they are incapable of defending
themselves. Therefore, when an adult sees fit to violate
the innocence of a small child for their own lascivious
gratification, society deems this behavior to be among
the worst of the worst.    
Louisiana Sex Crimes Prosecutor, Kate
Bartholomew, has accuratley summed up the standards
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of decency that prevail today when she said, “the rape
of a child is more heinous and hideous than a homi-
cide.”331 She continued by stating that child rape “takes
away [the child’s] innocence. It takes away their child-
hood. It mutilates their spirit. It kills their soul.”332 The
cases that have stemmed from the decision in Coker v.
Georgia have considerably narrowed the states’ appli-
cation of the death penalty.  The Court has liberally con-
strued the proposition set in Coker to hold that
bright-line rules should be established in order to restrict
the application of the death penalty only to acts that
cause the victim’s death.333 This does not comport with
the u.S. Constitution, nor does it comport with the na-
tional consensus surrounding the death penalty.  In sum,
the Members of the Court must be admonished to stop
supplanting their “own judgment” for that of the people
and to respect the legislation of the state[s] in their death
penalty enactments.   It must be firmly held that the cre-
ation of bright line rules restricting the application of
the death penalty ends here and now.
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